Cardoza-Fonseca: Supreme Court Takes Initiative to End Current Inequities in Law of Asylum by Davenport, Erik J.
NOTE
Cardoza-Fonseca: SUPREME COURT TAKES
INITIATIVE TO END CURRENT INEQUITIES IN LAW
OF ASYLUM*
INTRODUCTION
The disregard of human rights, and the resulting persecution of
innocent persons has been responsible for developing the concept of
flight and asylum as the ultimate human right.1 Asylum has been
recognized for hundreds of years; its existence is based on man's
historically inhumane treatment of his fellow man.' The abundance
of international treaties and resolutions seeking to mitigate human
suffering serves as a sad reminder that the violation of human
rights continues throughout the world.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the recent case of INS v.
Cardoza-Fonsecal in light of international treaties, domestic legis-
lation, and United States policy governing the granting of refugee
status and asylum in the United States. This Note compares the
standards and policies governing the grant of refugee status and
asylum as provided in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 4 with that treaty's legislative implementation in
the United States.'
This comparison is intended to illustrate inherent inequities in
U.S. law concerning the granting of political asylum and to demon-
strate the significance of the Cardoza-Fonseca decision in cur-
tailing lower court confusion regarding the proper standard for de-
termining an individual's eligibility for asylum. This Note will
* California Western International Law Journal S. Houston Lay Award 1986-1987.
I. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM (1980).
2. For an excellent historical survey of the right of asylum, see I A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1966).
3. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
5. The Refugee Act Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1251 (1982).
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further suggest that although Cardoza-Fonseca is a victory for
those seeking asylum in the United States, the decision ultimately
may be eroded by political pressure from the Executive branch dis-
favoring asylum applications from persons fleeing governments sup-
ported by the United States. Further erosion may occur as a result
of the Attorney General's broad discretionary power to deny
asylum.
In conclusion, this Note recommends procedures and policies
which would bring the application of U.S. law into greater con-
formity with the United Nation's Protocol, and further the cause of
human rights. However, before a meaningful understanding of Car-
doza-Fonseca is possible, it is necessary to understand the concepts
of "refugee" and "political asylum" in the world arena, and their
relationship to U.S. law.
I. RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO DOMESTIC LAW
IN U.S. COURTS
In the U.S. Constitution, recognition of domestic and interna-
tional treaties is found in Article VI, Section 2, which provides
that:
All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 6
Furthermore, while not mentioned in the Constitution, customary
international law has also been recognized as a part of United
States domestic law.7 There is also authority that customary law
has the same status as treaty law.8 Thus, both treaties and, to some
extent, international resolutions bind U.S. courts, and should be
given great weight in interpreting domestic legislation concerning
those instruments.
A. Political Asylum in the World Arena and the United States
The traditional right of asylum9 is understood as the right of a
state to grant asylum. The world community, however, has only re-
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
7. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981); see infra note 14.
8. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) §
102 comment j (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
9. The word "asylum" is derived from the Greek word "asylon," a-, without syle,
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cently become aware of the individual's right of asylum."0 An indi-
vidual's right to asylum has, at least in principle, been recognized
in several international instruments. Article Fourteen of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone has the
right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion." ' The Declaration as a whole is couched in broad, nontechni-
cal language and is clearly intended to apply to "everyone."'
' 2
While not a treaty, and therefore without the immediate force of
international law, this resolution has been referred to as "the
Magna Carta of contemporary international human rights law."' 3
Many of its principles have been transmuted from mere resolution
into binding customary international law.'
Article 27 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man provides that "[e]very person has- the right ... to seek and
receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of
each country and with international agreement."'" This Declaration
further demonstrates international recognition of an individual's
right of asylum.
In 1951, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was
opened for signature.' 6 Among other things, the Convention estab-
lished a definition of "refugee," which was made applicable to
events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951.1 In 1967, the
right of seizure. "'Asylum" means "without the right of seizure." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 91 (1962).
10. See supra note 2. The International Court Justice in the Asylum Case defined
asylum as "only the normal exercise of ... territorial sovereignty." 1950 I.C.J. 266. On the
other hand, the right of asylum as a right for the individual may be established in provisions
of municipal law.
II. G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
12. R. LILLICH. INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC
COURTS 6 (1985):
[t]he Government of the United States presumes that whenever a treaty has been
duly concluded and ratified by the acknowledged authorities ..., an obligation is
thereby imposed upon each and every department of the Government, to carry it
into complete effect, according to its terms, and that on the performance of this
obligation consists the due observance of good faith among nations.
13. R. LILLICH. THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 42 (1985).
14. Customary international law is established by showing a widespread practice by
states of conforming to an alleged rule, together with evidence that they have followed this
practice because they believe that they are under a normative obligation to comply with that
rule. In Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980), the U.S. Court of Appeals
cited the Declaration in concluding that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of
nations."
15. O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I! 23, doc. 21, rev. 6, signed May 2, 1948.
16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
17. Id. art. I(A)(2). The convention was established to account for the refugees of
19871
3
Davenport: Cardoza-Fonseca: Supreme Court Takes Initiative to End Current In
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Proto-
col)"8 was opened for signature, and in 1968 the United States
signed it. The Protocol incorporated the terms of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 9 and expressly provides that its
provisions are not limited to European events prior to 1951.20 Un-
like a resolution, the Protocol is a treaty and has the force of law in
the United States upon its ratification.2"
B. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
The United States has maintained a poor record of ratification
with regard to international human rights treaties." However, its
ratification of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is a
significant step forward in U.S. policy." Under the Constitution,
the Protocol as ratified has the force of domestic law and is not, at
least in theory, subject to the uncertainties found in customary in-
ternational law.2
Among other things, the Protocol establishes a definition of "ref-
ugee." The term "refugee" applies to any person who has a "well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group or political opin-
ion."" The Protocol's definition of "refugee" is of primary impor-tance in asylum cases since eligibility for asylum is dependent upon
WWII.
18. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol was ratified by
U.S., Oct. 4, 1968; see 114 Cong. Rec. 29, 607 (1968).
19. See supra note 16.
20. See supra note 17.
21. See supra note 6 and 12 and accompanying text.
22. Significant human rights treaties and resolutions not yet ratified include: Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.
23. See supra note 18.
24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25. Protocol, art. I, § 2. The Protocol defines "refugee" as a person, who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or owing to such fear,
is unwilling to return to it.
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whether or not one fits its criteria.
Of further importance is the Protocol's prohibition of refoule-
ment. 8 Article 33, section 1, provides that:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion."
Although the Protocol was ratified in 1968, it was not until 1980
that Congress passed legislation implementing its provisions. This
legislation is referred to as The Refugee Act of 1980 (Act). 8
II. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
The Refugee Act was designed to establish a comprehensive pro-
gram for refugee admissions. It replaces an older, piecemeal system
which limited refugee eligibility to those who had fled Communist
countries or the Middle East because of persecution or natural di-
sasters .2  The Act repealed the prior law's discriminatory treatment
of refugees by adopting the Protocol's apolitical definition of "refu-
gee." That definition both recognizes the plight of homeless people
all over the world and accords refugees the same immigration sta-
tus given all other immigrants." Furthermore, the Act established
new procedures for granting asylum to aliens in the United
States. 1
The Refugee Act is codified in the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA). INA section 208(a) authorizes the Attorney General to
establish procedures for aliens physically present in the United
States to apply for asylum. An alien may be granted asylum only if
26. Article 33 of the Protocol defines "refoulement" as "expulsion or return."
27. Similar language appears in art. 22, § 8 of the American Convention of Human
Rights. See supra note 22.
28. See supra note 5.
29. Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S. Immigration
Law and Policy: 1952-1979, at 86-89 (Comm. Print 1979). Prior to the Immigration and
Nationality Act's amendment in 1980, the law provided specifically for the conditional entry
of 17,400 refugees under the seventh preference category. The preference system limits the
number of available visas to countries on a first-come, first-served basis. Eligibility for sev-
enth preference entry was limited to refugees who had fled Communist countries or the Mid-
dle East due to persecution and natural disaster.
30. 125 Cong. Rec. S2630 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
The Refugee Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] by revis-
ing the procedures by which asylum and withholding of deportation are granted.
31. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. 1158. Prior to the Act, there was no specific policy dealing
with asylum procedures.
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the Attorney General determines that the alien falls within the
Act's definition of "refugee. 3 2
The alien carries the burden of proof in establishing his status as
a refugee in order to be considered for asylum.3 a The district direc-
tor of the alien's port of entry may approve or deny the asylum
application in the exercise of his discretion.34 Thus, under current
law, an alien who fulfills the Act's definition of "refugee" will be
eligible merely for consideration for asylum, but has no statutory
right to such a status. This broad discretion granted to the district
director undermines not only the spirit of the Protocol, but also
Congress' attempt to repeal the discriminatory treatment of refu-
gees in prior law. a5
Along with a grant of asylum, a primary remedy from deporta-
tion is "withholding of deportation. 38  The alien has a statutory
right to apply for withholding of deportation during the course of
deportation proceedings.37 Withholding of deportation is governed
by INA section 234(h) and provides that:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . to
a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such a country on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.38
Thus, an alien may avoid deportation if the conditions of either sec-
tion 208 or 243(h) are met.
32. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such per-
son's nationality or .... is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group or political opinion .... (emphasis added).
33. Procedures promulgated by the Attorney General for granting asylum are codified
in the Code of Federal Regulations. Asylum Procedures, 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1986).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8 (1986).
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h). Withholding of deportation is mandated if an
"alien's life or freedom would be threatened upon return on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."
37. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1986). This section also provides that "[a]sylum requests
made after institution of exclusion or deportations proceedings shall be . . .considered as
requests for withholding exclusion or deportation pursuant to § 243(h) of the Act."
38. INA § 243(h) was amended in 1980 to conform with the Protocol's prohibition of
refoulement, art. 33, § I. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 18
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A. A Comparison of INA Section 208 Asylum and INA
Section 243(h) Withholding of Deportation
An alien can be denied asylum or withholding of deportation
under particular circumstances. Aliens are ineligible for withhold-
ing of deportation under section 243(h) if they:-9 (1) have "or-
dered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution
of others";'0 (2) have been convicted of a "particularly serious
crime" and constitute a danger to the "community of the United
States"; 1 (3) appear to have committed a serious, nonpolitical
crime outside the United States prior to entry; 2 or (4) pose a "dan-
ger to the security of the United States."' a Likewise, aliens are in-
eligible for asylum under section 208 if they:"" (1) fall within any
of the four enumerated categories above; (2) are not refugees
within the meaning of INA section 101(a)(42)(A); 4' (3) have been
firmly resettled in a foreign country;' 6 or (4) are given an outstand-
ing offer of resettlement by a third nation and such resettlement is
in the public interest.'
INA section 243(h) departs from INA section 208 in two other
significant ways. First, once it is determined that an alien's life or
freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, the
Attorney General "shall not deport or return the alien." Thus, un-
like the grant of asylum, a grant of withholding of deportation is
not discretionary, but is expressly mandated on the fulfillment of
39. INA § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2).
40. Matter of McMullen, Int. Dec. 2967 (B.I.A. 1984). Respondent had participated
in the persecution of individuals who opposed the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and
therefore was statutorily ineligible for both asylum and withholding of deportation.
41. Matter of Rodriquez-Coto, Int. Dec. 2985 (B.I.A. 1985). Applicant convicted of a
"particularly serious crime" and found to "constitute a danger to the U.S.," therefore grant
of asylum and withholding of deportation denied. See also Matter of Carballe, Int. Dec.
3007 (B.I.A. 1986).
42. Matter of McMullen, Int. Dec. 2967 (B.I.A. 1984). Where respondent's acts were
out of proportion to his political goals, his conduct provided serious reason or considering
that he had committed serious non-political crimes prior to his arrival in the U.S., therefore
he is ineligible for relief of asylum or withholding of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(l)(v)
(1986).
43. Matter of Frentescu, Int. Dec. 2906 (B.I.A. 1982). Withholding of deportation as
well as asylum not available to an alien who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
"particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States."
44. INA § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f) (1986).
45. Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971). Where the applicant is not subject to
persecution, he does not meet the definition of refugee.
46. Matter of Portales, Int. Dec. 2905 (B.I.A. 1982). Applicant granted refuge status
while in Peru and permitted to live in that country without restrictions held to be "firmly
resettled," and therefore not entitled to refugee status in the United States.
47. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(2) (1986).
1987]
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the conditions in section 243(h).
Second, unlike the procedure to grant asylum, section 243(h)
does not employ the term "refugee" as defined in INA section
101(a)(42)(A). Hence, the "well-founded fear of persecution" pro-
vision is not incorporated into the "withholding of deportation"
remedy. This last distinction suggests that there are two different
standards by which grants of asylum and grants of withholding of
deportation are determined. 8
B. Differing Standards Between Sections 208 and 243(h)
To be eligible for asylum under INA section 208(a), an alien
must establish that he or she is a "refugee" under INA section
101(a)(42)(A).' 9 Whether or not one is a refugee is determined by
whether the applicant is a victim of persecution or has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.50
Thus, the applicable standard for a grant of asylum is a "well-
founded fear of persecution."
The most thorough description of the phrase "well-founded fear
of persecution" is contained in the United Nations' Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees."' The Handbook has been recognized by the courts, in-
cluding the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),5 ' as a useful tool
in providing an internationally recognized interpretation of the Pro-
tocol.5" The Handbook places great emphasis on the state of mind
of an individual applying for asylum. It notes that the phrase "well-
founded fear" constitutes two distinct elements, the first "fear,"
and the second "well-founded," and implies that it is not only the
48. Although INA § 243(h) was amended to conform to the Protocol's prohibition of
refoulement, it did not employ the term "refugee" as provided in the protocol. It is notewor-
thy that article 42 of the Protocol provides that no State shall make reservations as to article
I or 33. As amended, INA § 243(h) does not provide a "well-founded fear of persecution"
standard, or any other standard upon its face by which a determination to withhold deporta-
tion can be made. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 32.
50. Id.
51. HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFU-
GEES. Geneva, 1979 [hereinafter Handbook].
52. Appeal is made from the immigration court to the BIA, from which appeal is
made to the U.S. Court of Appeals.
53. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (B.I.A. 1985); Zavala Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d
562, 567 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 18
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frame of mind of the person concerned that determines his refugee
status, but that his frame of mind must be supported by an objec-
tive situation.5" The Handbook's emphasis however is placed on the
subjective element of "fear." Therefore, "determination of refugee
status will primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's state-
ments rather than a judgment on the situation prevailing in his
country of origin." 55 Despite the Handbook's clear definition, the
BIA and several circuit courts attempting to reach a definitive in-
terpretation of the phrase "well-founded fear" had arrived at con-
flicting results. 56
On the other hand, INA section 243(h) withholding of deporta-
tion does not employ the term "refugee," and hence the standard of
a "well-founded fear of persecution" is not applicable to it.5" In
INS v. Stevic,5 8 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the applicable
standard in determining a grant of withholding of deportation is a
"clear probability of persecution." 59 Thus, the question under this
standard is "whether it is more likely than not that the alien would
be subject to persecution. '"60 The court, while specifically declining
to interpret the standard of "well-founded fear of persecution,"'"
stated that "[flor purposes of our analysis, we may assume ... that
the well-founded fear standard is more generous than the clear
probability of persecution standard. .. .
C. In the Aftermath of Stevic
Because a grant of withholding of deportation is not discretion-
ary and results in a prohibition of refoulement, 63 it is reasonable
that a person invoking this remedy should be required to show, as a
factual matter, that persecution would be more likely than not.
With regard to asylum, however, many courts, including the BIA,
had concluded that even though a grant of asylum is discretionary
and does not result in a prohibition of refoulement, the asylum
54. Handbook, supra note 51, at paragraph 38.
55. Id. paragraph 37.
56. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
58. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
59. Id. at 422.
60. Id. at 424.
61. Id. at 430. "We do not decide the meaning of the phrase 'well-founded fear of
persecution' which is applicable . . .to requests for discretionary asylum."
62. Id. at 425.
63. INA § 243(h)(1) & (2).
1987]
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seeker must still show that persecution is more likely than not."'
This interpretation clearly ignored the subjective element of the
well-founded fear standard.65 Thus, by declining to define the
meaning of "well-founded fear" in Stevic, the Supreme Court per-
petuated the inconsistent use of the standard applied in asylum
cases in both the circuit courts and the BIA.
For example, in Matter of Acosta," the BIA adhered to its pre-
Stevic view when it held that a "well-founded fear of persecution"
means:
[T]hat an individual's fear of persecution must have its basis in
external, or objective, facts that show there is a realistic likeli-
hood he will be persecuted upon his return to a particular
country."
The BIA established a four-part test to determine if an applicant
had met the standard of a "well-founded fear of persecution." The
applicant was required to show that: (1) he possesses a belief or
characteristic that the persecutor targets for punishment; (2) the
persecutor is aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien
possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the ca-
pability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor is inclined to
inflict the punishment.68
In effect, the BIA's adoption of an objective definition of a "well-
founded fear" had presented an almost insurmountable burden of
proof upon the alien, with little regard to the subjective element of
the standard.69 Ironically, under the BIA's interpretation of the
asylum standard, the alien was required to prove the subjective in-
tentions of his persecutors, while substantiating his own fears with
external, objective facts. Hence, the BIA had equated the more
generous well-founded fear standard with that of the clear
probability of persecution standard required in withholding of de-
portation cases."0 This result was clearly contrary to the spirit of
the Protocol as evinced by the Handbook, and resulted in untold
hardship and injury to persons denied a grant of asylum.7 1
64. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
66. Int. Dec. 2986 (B.I.A. 1985).
67. Id. at 21.
68. Id. at 22.
69. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71. Handbook, supra note 51, paragraph 37. "Determination of refugee status will
primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judgment on the
situation prevailing in his country of origin." The Handbook places great emphasis on the
[Vol. 18
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The Third Circuit had also concluded that asylum and withhold-
ing standards were identical. In Sankan v. INA, 72 the court re-
jected the dicta in Stevic that the standard for asylum is more gen-
erous than that of withholding, pointing instead to the Supreme
Court's specific refusal to rule on the meaning of "well-founded
fear of persecution" for asylum purposes.
In Nasser v. INSs7 3 the Sixth Circuit equated asylum and with-
holding standards, requiring that the alien show and corroborate
with evidence that he would be "singled out" for persecution based
on corroborating evidence.
In Garcia-Mir v. Smith, "7 the Seventh Circuit also adopted the
BIA's interpretation of a "well-founded fear" by equating it with
the withholding standard.
In contrast to these decisions, other circuit courts distinguished
the evidentiary standard between asylum and withholding of depor-
tation. The Fifth Circuit recognized the proper standard by which
asylum claims are established in Guevarav. Flores7 5 when it held:
An alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasona-
ble person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she were
to be returned to her native country. In so holding, we stand with
the Sixth76 the Seventh,7 and the Ninth Circuits78 which have
previously determined that the "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion" standard imposed on asylum applicants differs from the
"clear probability of persecution" standard imposed by Stevic on
aliens who seek withholding of deportation.7 9
Furthermore, conflicting conclusions were reached among the
panels of the Sixtha" and Seventh Circuits8" as to the applicable
standard in asylum cases. Thus, one panel of the Seventh Circuit
subjective element of the asylum standard since many persons fleeing their persecutors have
little or no direct evidence to satisfy the objective element of the standard.
72. 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985).
73. 744 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1984).
74. 766 F.2d 1478 (7th Cir. 1985).
75. 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986).
76. Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984) (clear probability of perse-
cution standard applies only to petitions for withholding of deportation).
77. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1984) (burden on asylum
applicant is similar, but not identical, to that imposed by the clear probability standard).
78. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984) (clear probability
of persecution required for withholding of deportation, but alien seeking asylum need only
establish a valid reason for fear).
79. Guevara, 786 F.2d at 1249 (emphasis added).
80. Youkhanna, 749 F.2d at 362. In contrast, the court concluded that an asylum
claim could be established through the "persuasive, credible testimony" of the alien, "show-
ing actual persecution or good reason to fear persecution."
81. Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 574-575.
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adopted the language of the Supreme Court in its Stevic dicta, that
a "reasonable possibility" of persecution is sufficient to back up a
well-founded fear, as opposed to the likelihood or probability neces-
sary to support a withholding claim.82
This brief survey of case decisions reveals the striking dishar-
mony which existed among the circuit courts, and at times, among
their various panels, both before and after Stevic. Because of the
unjust results which accrued from the narrow interpretation of the
Refugee Act's provision on asylum, 83 and conflict among lower
courts, the issue of the proper standard for asylum became ripe for
consideration by the Supreme Court.
Ill. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: A TIME FOR CHANGE
After the Stevic decision, any further confusion as to the proper
standard for asylum applicants was put to rest in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca."s In this case, the re-
spondent, Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, had entered the United
States in 1979 as a visitor from Nicaragua. After remaining in the
United States longer than permitted, the INS commenced deporta-
tion proceedings against her. Although respondent conceded that
she was in the country illegally, she requested withholding of depor-
tation pursuant to section 243(h), and asylum as a refugee pursu-
ant to section 208(a).8 5 To support her claim for withholding of
deportation, the respondent attempted to show that if she were re-
turned to Nicaragua, her "life or freedom would be threatened" on
account of her political views. To support her claim for asylum, she
attempted to show that she had a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion" upon her return." She presented evidence that her brother
had been tortured and imprisoned because of his political activities
in Nicaragua, and that if returned, her own political opposition to
the Sandinistas would be exposed. Based on these facts, respondent
82. Id.
83. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (B.I.A. 1985). Asylum applicant was a founder
of a taxi co-op in El Salvador in which other co-founders had been murdered. Because appli-
cant could not show that he had been singled out for a persecution he was denied a grant of
asylum.
84. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207
(1987). Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, and O'Conner, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion. Scalia, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehn-
quist, C.J., and White, J., joined.
85. Id. 107 S. Ct. at 1209.
86. Id.
(Vol. 18
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1 [2015], Art. 23
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss1/23
NOTE: CARDOZA- FONSECA
claimed that she would be interrogated and tortured if returned. 87
The Immigration Judge applied the same standard in evaluating
the respondent's claim for withholding of deportation as he did in
evaluating her application for asylum.88 The Judge found that she
had not established "a clear probability of persecution" and there-
fore was not entitled to either form of relief.8 9 The BIA affirmed,
holding that respondent had failed to establish that she would suf-
fer persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) or 243(h). 90
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, respondent did
not challenge the BIA's decision regarding withholding of deporta-
tion. However, she argued that the Immigration Judge and BIA
erred in applying the "more likely than not" standard of proof from
section 243(h) to her section 208(a) asylum claim.9" Relying on
both the text and structure of the Act, the Ninth Circuit held that
the lower courts erred by not applying the "well-founded fear"
standard to the asylum proceedings, and that such a standard is
"more generous, than the 'clear probability' standard which gov-
erns withholding of deportation proceedings." ' The court inter-
preted the standard to require asylum applicants to present "spe-
cific facts" through objective evidence to prove either past
persecution or "good reason" to fear future persecution.9" The court
remanded respondent's asylum claim to the BIA to evaluate it
under the proper legal standard. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve circuit conflicts concerning the standard. 4
A. The Majority's Interpretation of the Well-Founded Fear
Standard
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that the "perse-
cution or well-founded fear of persecution" standard governs the
Attorney General's determination of whether an alien is eligible for
asylum since eligibility for asylum depends on the Attorney Gen-
eral's determination of whether an alien is a "refugee" under INA
section 101(a)(42)(A)."' Stevens went on to note that the 1980
87. Id. at 1209-1210.
88. Id. at 1210.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1211.
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Refugee Act removed the Attorney General's discretion in with-
holding of deportation proceedings, while at the same time, the
term "refugee", and hence the "well-founded fear" standard, was
made an integral part of asylum procedure.96
The government argued that even though the "well-founded
fear" standard is applicable to asylum applicants, the only way an
applicant can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution" is
to prove a "clear probability of persecution." 9
Justice Stevens rebutted this argument by noting that:
[t]he language Congress used to describe the two standards con-
veys very different meanings. The "would be threatened" lan-
guage of section 243(h) has no subjective component, but instead
requires the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more
likely than not that he or she will be subject to persecution upon
deportation. 8
The court noted in contrast, that "the reference to 'fear' in the sec-
tion 208(a) standard obviously makes the eligibility determination
turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the alien." 99
"That the fear must be 'well-founded' does not alter the obvious
focus on the individuals subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the
standard into a 'more likely than not' one." 100 "One can certainly
have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less
than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place." '
Although the BIA agreed that the term "fear" refers to "a sub-
jective condition, an emotion characterized by the anticipation or
awareness of danger", °1 in essence, the government's contention
was that the "fear" of return must be based on the chance that
persecution would be more likely than not. Thus, where the chance
of persecution was less than 51% upon return, the degree of fear
harbored by the alien would be insufficient to gain a grant of asy-
lum. This argument was squarely rejected by the majority on the
ground that even if a one in ten chance of death or imprisonment
were to exist in a country, "it would be only too apparent that any-
one who has managed to escape from the country in question will
have 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' upon his eventual
96. Id. at 1212.
97. id.
98. Id. at 1212-1213.
99. Id. at 1213.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1213 n.1l.
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return."10
After discussing the ordinary and obvious meaning of the
phrases, the majority noted that "[t]he different emphasis of the
two standards which is so clear on the face of the statute is signifi-
cantly highlighted by the fact that the same Congress simultane-
ously drafted section 208(a) and amended section 243(h).' ' 4
Under general rules of statutory construction, the majority found
the standards to differ since "it is generally presumed that Con-
gress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion and
exclusion."' 18
B. Majority's Examination of the Refugee Act's History, the
Protocol and Rejection of Senate Bill S.643
The majority then examined the history of the Act, first looking
to the practice prior to its passage in 1980,101 then to the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 07 and finally,
congressional rejection of Senate Bill S. 643.
1. History of Refugee Act
Prior to the 1980 amendments, there was no statutory basis for
granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United
States. 0 8 However, under INA section 203(a)(7), the Attorney
General could permit "conditional entry" to refugees fleeing com-
munist-dominated areas or the Middle East. The majority noted
that the standard for "conditional entry" was "unquestionably
more lenient than the 'clear probability' standard applied in section
243(h) proceedings,"'' 0 9 and required only a showing that the appli-
cant was unwilling to return because of persecution or fear of per-
secution. Thus, section 203(a)(7) provided an acceptable standard
under the Protocol, except for the fact that it made various unac-
ceptable geographic and political distinctions. "The legislative his-
tory" thus "indicates that Congress in no way wished to modify the
standard that had been used under section 203(a)(7)."" 0
103. Id. at 1213 (quoting I A. GRAHL-MADSEN. THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 180 (1966)).
104. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
108. INA § 203(a)(7). See supra note 31.
109. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1214.
110. Id. at 1215.
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2. The Protocol
The majority then examined the United Nations Protocol, and
found that one of Congress' primary purposes in passing the 1980
Act was to bring U.S. refugee law into conformity with the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.11 ' As such, "[tihe
Conference Committee Report, for example, stated that the defini-
tion [of "refugee"] was accepted 'with the understanding that it is
based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended
that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol.' "112
The majority found that the Committee which drafted the provision
intended the "well-founded fear of being a victim of persecution" to
mean that one has actually been a victim of persecution or can
show good reason why he fears persecution. 13 Having found the
1967 Protocol to incorporate the "well-founded fear" test without
modification, the standard "certainly does not require an alien to
show that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted in
order to be classified as a 'refugee.' "114 The majority found addi-
tional support for its conclusion in the Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.1 5 After noting that
the United Nations High Commissioner's analysis of the "well-
founded fear" standard was consistent with the majority's own ex-
amination, Justice Stevens stated:
There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for con-
cluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being
shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no
"well-founded fear" of the event happening.116
The majority reasoned that "so long as an objective situation is es-
tablished by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation
will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution
is a reasonable possibility.1 117 "Thus, as made binding on the
United States through the Protocol", section 208(a) "provides for a
precatory, or discretionary, benefit for the entire class of persons
who qualify as 'refugees' whereas" section 243(h) "provides an en-
titlement for the subcategory that 'would be threatened' with perse-
I I. See supra note 4.
112. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1216; S. Rep. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980); see also H.R. Rep. No. 9, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
113. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1216.
114. Id. at 1217.
115. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
116. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1217.
117. Id.
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cution upon their return."118
3. Rejection of Senate Bill S.643
A third source relied upon by the majority in interpreting the
proper standard for asylum was Congressional rejection of Senate
Bill S. 643.11' To be eligible for asylum, the House Bill 20 provided
that an alien must be a "refugee" to gain asylum, and such a grant
was within the Attorney General's discretion. The Senate Bill im-
posed the additional requirement that the refugee would not obtain
asylum unless "his deportation or return would be prohibited under
section 243(h)." 21 The majority concluded that while neither bill
affected the standard used to determine whether an alien is a "refu-
gee," the Senate's inclusion of the section 243(h) standard to cover
asylum was recognition that there is a difference between the "well-
founded fear" standard and the clear probability standard. 2 Thus,
"enactment of the House Bill rather than the Senate Bill [demon-
strated] that Congress eventually refused to restrict eligibility for
asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standard. 123
The government argued that the two standards should be identi-
cal since section 208(a) affords greater benefits than section
243(h).1 24 However, the majority noted that while asylum affords
greater benefits than withholding of deportation, one who satisfies
the definition of refugee does not have the right to remain in the
United States, but "is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney
General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it."' 12 ' Thus, the major-
ity concluded that "[tfhere is no basis for the Government's asser-
tion that the discretionary/mandatory distinction has no practical
significance."1 2 6
The Government further argued that the BIA's interpretation of
the Refugee Act is entitled to substantial deference, even if the in-
tent of Congress would compel a finding that the asylum standard
118. Id. at 1218.
119. Id.; 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
120. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
121. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1218; S. Rep. 26.
122. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1218.
123. Id. at 1219.
124. An alien granted withholding of deportation may be deported to another country
in which he does not face persecution. However, an alien granted asylum may remain in the
United States and will become eligible for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent
resident after one year of residence pursuant to INA § 209.
125. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1219.
126. Id.
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is more generous than that for withholding of deportation. 27 The
majority noted that the question of statutory construction is one for
the courts to decide. Thus, if the interpretation of a statute "repre-
sents reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute," it should not be
disturbed "unless it appears from the statute or its legislative his-
tory that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned. ' 128 The majority, having found that Congress did not
intend the two standards to be identical, found the Government's
argument unpersuasive.'
9
The majority went on to note that "some ambiguity in a term
like 'well-founded fear'" could be given concrete meaning through
case-by-case adjudication.130 Thus, the majority held that "[w]e do
not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the well-
founded fear test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that
the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that
the two standards are identical." 13' From the foregoing analysis, "it
is clear that Congress did not intend to restrict eligibility for [asy-
lum] to those who could prove that it is more likely than not that
they will be persecuted if deported.""12
C. Concurring Opinions
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized his under-
standing that the Court's opinion had directed the INS to the ap-
propriate sources from which the meaning of the "well-founded
fear" standard would be derived, even though the meaning would
be refined in later adjudication."' 3 These sources consist of plain
meaning, the United Nations Protocol, international law and schol-
arly commentaries.1" Justice Blackmun further noted that the pro-
cess of "case-by-case adjudication" of a precise formulation of the
"'well-founded fear" standard was already underway by the Courts
127. Id. at 1220.
128. Id. at 1221 n.29 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-383
(1961)).
129. Id. at 1220-1221. The majority further rejected the Government's argument that
an agency interpretation of a statute deserves substantial deference since the BIA has taken
inconsistent positions through the years. "An agency interpretation of a relevant provision
which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less defer-
ence' than a consistently held agency view." Id. at 1221 n.30.
130. Id. at 1221.
131. Id. at 1222.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1223.
134. Id.
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of Appeals. 8 ' In an insightful conclusion, Blackmun stated that:
The efforts of these courts stand in stark contrast to-but, it is
sad to say, alone cannot make up for-the years of seemingly
purposeful blindness by the INS, which only now begins its task
of developing the standard entrusted to its care.' 36
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment insofar as the "well-
founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard are
not equivalent.1 37 Justice Scalia found it "ill advised", however,
that the majority undertook an "exhaustive investigation of the leg-
islative history of the Act where the a language of the statute was
clear. "[I]f the language of a statute is clear, that language must
be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity. "188
D. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Powell'3 9 argued that it has never
been the BIA's position that an alien "demonstrate an objectively
quantifiable risk of persecution in their homeland that is more than
50%" before acquiring asylum.14 0 Ironically, Justice Powell further
stated that the "BIA has concluded that there is no practical dis-
tinction between the objective proofs an alien must submit to be
eligible for these two forms of relief.'' Finding the "BIA's inter-
pretation of the statute reasonable," the dissent argued that the
BIA's decision should be affirmed.14 2 In granting the BIA's inter-
pretation substantial deference, the dissent quoted from the BIA's
decision in Matter of Acosta. 1 3 In that case the BIA found that an
alien must establish a "well-founded fear of persecution" by evi-
dence which demonstrates that:
(1) the alien possess a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks
to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2)
the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware,
that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the perse-
cutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the perse-
cutor has the inclination to punish the alien. 4
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1223-24.
138. Id. at 1224.
139. Id. at 1225. (Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., joined).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Int. Dec. 2986 (B.I.A. 1985).
144. Id.
1987]
19
Davenport: Cardoza-Fonseca: Supreme Court Takes Initiative to End Current In
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
As noted earlier, this four-part test requires proof of facts which
would demonstrate a realistic likelihood of persecution. However, in
effect, it requires the alien to prove the subjective intentions of his
persecutors, while substantiating his own fears with external, objec-
tive facts. Thus, the dissent appeared willing to defer to agency in-
terpretation regardless of the plain language and legislative history
of the statutes governing asylum.
The dissent further stated that "[tihe Court notes that the lan-
guage of section 208(a) differs from the language of section 243(h)
in that it contemplates a partially subjective inquiry. From this pre-
mise, the Court moves . . . to the conclusion that the objective in-
quiries under the two sections necessarily are different. 1 45 Thus,
the dissent argued in effect, that the term "well-founded" presents
an objective determination, which "in practice" is no different than
the objective basis required for there to be a "clear probability" of
persecution. 1 6
Justice Powell sidestepped the majority's emphasis on the com-
plete term "well-founded fear" by stating that "[b]ecause both
standards necessarily contemplate some objective basis, I cannot
agree with the Court's implicit conclusion that the statute resolves
this question on its face. 1 4 7 Justice Powell then concluded that
"the character of evidence sufficient to meet these two standards is
best answered by . . ." the BIA." 8 The dissent substantiated this
conclusion on the ground that the "Attorney General has delegated
the responsibility for making these determinations to the BIA," and
that the "Board has examined more of these cases than any court
ever has or can."" 9
While accusing the majority of ignoring the "practical realities"
and concentrating on "semantic niceties," the dissent stated that
"[g]overnments rarely persecute people by the numbers.' 50 From
this, the dissent assumed that one's fear is not "well-founded" un-
less there is a "realistic likelihood" that persecution will occur.15'
Although stating that the majority provided no "positive basis for
arguing there is a material difference between the two standards,"
the dissent failed to find a "positive basis" in its own interpretation
145. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1227.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1228.
150. Id.; see infra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
151. Id.; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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of legislative history that the standards are essentially the same.
The dissent argued that the words "well-founded fear" are actually
derived from the Attorney General's own regulation governing ap-
plications for asylum. 52 Such a conclusion, in light of the Proto-
col's history and its legislative implementation in the United States,
is highly questionable. "
The dissent further argued that materials interpreting the Proto-
col are "only marginally relevant,"' " since "statements by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have no binding
force," and since "the determination of refugee status . . . is incum-
bent upon the Contracting State."1 55 However, while citing the
Handbook for authority that "determination of refugee status...
is incumbent upon the Contracting State," the dissent suspiciously
ignored the Handbook's extensive emphasis on the alien's subjec-
tive state of mind. To ignore the subjective element of "well-
founded fear" is clearly contrary to the Protocol, and therefore
U.S. law. 56
Finally, the dissent rejected settled principles of statutory con-
struction by criticizing the majority's analysis of the Conference
Committee's rejection of Senate Bill S. 643.157 Senate Bill S. 643
authorized the Attorney General to grant asylum only if the alien
was found to be a "refugee," and his deportation or return would
be prohibited under section 243(h).15 1 This Bill was rejected in
favor of House Bill H.R. 2816,159 which provided that an alien was
eligible for asylum if he or she was a "refugee" under the Act.10
The dissent rejected the common sense conclusion that Congress
did not intend to adopt the stricter standard provided for in Senate
Bill S. 643. Instead, it argued that "[tihe language of the Senate
Bill [did] not demonstrate that the Senate recognized a difference
between the two standards." The dissent appeared to argue that the
true intent of the legislators was that there was no question as to
wording when deciding which bill to adopt. Indeed, the dissent rea-
soned that "there is no reason to believe that the minor differences
in wording between the Senate Bill and the Act as passed reflect a
152. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1229.
153. See supra note 31.
154. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1229.
155. Id. at 1230 (quoting the Handbook).
156. See supra notes 6 and 12 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
158. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1230.
159. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
160. See supra note 32.
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rejection of the position that there is no significant difference be-
tween the two standards." '61 Thus, in rejecting settled rules of stat-
utory construction, the dissent asserted that it will "place no weight
on the Conference Committee's choice of the language of the
House Bill."' 62
Having ignored the plain language and legislative history of the
Act, the dissent proceeded to argue that the majority "ignored the
words in which the BIA framed its decision," and "failed to ex-
amine factual findings on which the decision rested."'' 3 Unfortu-
nately, the dissent missed the issue of whether the standards of asy-
lum and withholding of deportation differ, and instead argued the
weight of the respondent's evidence.
IV. INEQUITIES IN ASYLUM LAW AFTER Cardoza-Fonseca
Although the Cardoza-Fonseca decision is a victory for those
seeking asylum, the war may yet be lost. When confronting the
BIA, 11' the alien faces obvious difficulties in establishing his burden
of proof. Yet a more inherent difficulty exists in the nature of dis-
cretion. While a grant of asylum is purely discretionary, upon re-
ceipt of a request for asylum the district director or immigration
judge must obtain an advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the Department of
State.' " Because the BHRHA's opinions are almost always form
letters that describe general country conditions according to the
State Department's foreign policy views, and because they are
heavily relied upon by Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) officials, their use has been challenged by advocates repre-
senting applicants for asylum. 66 The district director's decision to
grant or deny asylum need not be based upon the BHRHA opinion.
If it is however, the opinion must be made part of the record unless
161. Cardoza..Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1230.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1232.
164. The alien will file an application with the district director or if deportation pro-
ceedings have been instituted, with the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a) & (b)
(1986). If denied asylum by the district director, the alien will be placed under exclusion or
deportation proceedings at which point asylum may again be requested. From a denial, the
alien may appeal to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(3) & 208.10 (1986).
165. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7 & 208.10(b) (1986). The BHRHA opinion advises whether
the alien should be given a grant of asylum based on the conditions in the alien's country of
nationality.
166. A. HELTON. MANUAL ON REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS 23 (1984);
Chaverria v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 722 F.2d 666, 668-69 (11th Cir. 1984).
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otherwise classified. 167 Since both the INS and Department of
State are under the direction of the Executive Branch, they are
subject to the foreign and domestic policies of the administration in
power. As a result of this influence, advisory opinions issued by the
BHRHA are often permeated with ideological bias.
Despite concerns of bias, ideology continues to dominate the asy-
lum decision-making process. 168 While human rights are violated
throughout the world, it is quite apparent that one's chances of
gaining asylum in the United States are directly proportional to the
political, economic and military interests of the United States in
the alien's country of origin, and not to that country's record of
human rights.169
This observation can best be demonstrated by dividing several
nations from which persons have applied for asylum into two gen-
eral catagories. The first category represents those nations which
advocate political, economic and military interests contrary to that
of the United States. The second category represents those nations
which the United States supports, either for political, economic or
military reasons. Because the number of applicants for asylum var-
ies from nation to nation, the chart below indicates only the percent
of those aliens granted asylum from their respective nations of ori-
gin during 1986.170
The disparity in figures demonstrated in footnote 170 results
from a misapplication of laws established by Congress to conform
to the Protocol's provisions defining the term "refugee." Indeed, the
determination of who is entitled to refugee status, and therefore
asylum, is conspicuously inconsistent, and the Executive Branch of
167. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1986).
168. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service: Asylum
Cases Filed with the District Director Fiscal Year 1986. These figures represent the percent
of applicants who applied for and received a grant of asylum in fiscal year 1986 (ending Oct.
1986). A complete copy of these statistics is on file at the offices of the California Western
Law Review/International Law Journal, California Western School of Law.
19871
23
Davenport: Cardoza-Fonseca: Supreme Court Takes Initiative to End Current In
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Nations Which Are Not Supported
by United States Interests
Afghanistan
Bulgaria
China
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
East Germany
Iran
Libya
Nicaragua
Poland
Romania
Syria
U.S.S.R.
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Total Average Percentile
* Mariel Cubans entered the United States under the Attorney
General's grant of parole. INA § 212(d)(5)(B).
Nations Which Are Supported
by United States Interests
Bolivia
Chile
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Egypt
El Salvador
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
India
Iraq
Mexico
Pakistan
Panama
Philippines
South Africa
South Korea
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Total Average Percentile
Percentage of Applicants
Granted Asylum
25
100
38
0.25*
37
45
71
52
33
15
39
59
44
92
53
3
44
Percentage of Applicants
Granted Asylum
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our government plays a major role in this inequity.17 1
The violation of the rights of individuals by nations clearly is not
limited to those countries which the United States condemns. Many
nations which are supported by the United States have long histo-
ries as violators of human rights.' 72 Personal testimony and reports
indicate that the regular security and military forces in Guatemala
are responsible for arbitrary arrests, torture, "disappearance" and
extrajudicial executions of victims from all sectors of Guatemalan
society.' Plain-clothed government forces known as "death
squads" are responsible for mass extrajudicial execution in El Sal-
vador. 17 4 To date, more than 5,000 people have "disappeared" in El
Salvador, and over 40,000 murders go unsolved because "the state
is incapable of prosecuting the criminals. 175 Dominicans under de-
tention suffer from beatings, whippings and other forms of torture,
and many "disappear" following arrest.7 6 Cases of torture are
abundant in India, as well as "encounter killings." Encounter kill-
ings are staged encounters by police with "extremists" (or members
of the Communist Party) in which the extremists are extrajudi-
cially executed. 7
The reported cases of human rights violations are extensive, even
in those nations which the United States supports. As a result of
the Attorney General's broad discretion and Executive bias, it be-
comes clear that many aliens with bona fide claims are denied asy-
lum. Although Cardoza-Fonseca mandates that a lesser, more gen-
erous standard be applied in asylum cases, human suffering will not
be mitigated unless the standard is neutrally applied to all aliens.
V. A TIME FOR CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY
The Refuge Act was designed, among other things, to repeal the
prior law's discriminatory treatment of refugees and to provide a
171. A. HELTON, POLITICAL ASYLUM UNDER THE 1980 REFUGEE ACT: AN UNFUL-
FILLED PROMISE, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 243 (1984). In regard to El Salvador, the adminis-
tration had to certify to Congress periodically that El Salvador has shown progress in the
area of human rights in order to continue foreign aid. Thus, as a matter of foreign policy, the
Executive Branch (which includes the State Department and the INS) has every incentive to
characterize the situation in El Salvador as an improving one-an image that would be jeop-
ardized by granting asylum to Salvadorans,
172. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 1986 (1986).
173. Id. at 152.
174. Id. at 143.
175. Id. at 144.
176. Id. at 142.
177. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS 61 (1983).
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comprehensive program for refugee admission.17 8 However, current
data on asylum and country condition reports reveal that the Refu-
gee Act has not achieved its desired result. Although Cardoza-Fon-
seca is a step in the right direction, refugees applying for asylum
remain subject to discriminatory treatment based on the United
States' political, economic and military interests with their coun-
tries of origin. This result remains contrary to the policy advocated
in the Refugee Act.1 9 Furthermore, this result violates the spirit of
the Protocol since persons fitting the definition of "refugee" are
overwhelmingly denied a grant of asylum if their country of origin
is supported by United States interests.'8 0
A. Recommended Procedures and Policies
Several changes could bring U.S. policy into conformity with the
Protocol and the intent of Congress in enacting the Refugee Act of
1980.
First, in light of the discriminatory application of current law, 8'
Congress should impose limitations upon the discretionary nature
of granting asylum. 82 One such limitation could be achieved by
removing the district directors's sole discretion of approving or de-
nying asylum, and substituting it with that of an immigration
judge's. A trained judge is far more likely to weigh the merits of
each application for asylum, and to make a decision which is less
influenced by the INS. 8"
Second, BHRHA opinions should be supplemented or replaced
with more objective country reports.'8" Currently, many BHRHA
opinions reflect White House foreign policy, and neglect actual vio-
lations of human rights and the reasonable fears caused thereby.'85
There exist many organizations dedicated to the cause of human
rights which could provide a more accurate picture of human rights
violations throughout the world. 86 With a grant of asylum geared
178. See supra note 29.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 171.
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
182. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1986). The District Director may approve or deny the asy-
lum application in the exercise of discretion.
183. In 1983, "special inquiry officers" (immigration judges) were placed under the
Executive Office of Immigration Review in the Department of Justice, and are no longer
answerable to the INS.
184. See supra note 165.
185. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
186. Such organizations include: Americas Watch Committee; Amnesty International;
International Human Rights Law Group; and U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee.
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to actual country conditions, the asylum procedure would become
more equitable, and in the process would fulfill the intent of Con-
gress and the framers of the Protocol.
Third, the Supreme Court should take further steps to guide the
INS and BIA in a direction which reflects Congressional intent
when those bodies attempt to ascertain the meaning of the "well-
founded fear" standard. Such guidance is proper where the INS
followed for years a policy of "purposeful blindness" as to the stan-
dard of asylum entrusted to its care.
187
Fourth, a procedure could be developed whereby an alien denied
asylum by the district director would have an automatic right of
appeal to be heard before an immigration judge. The administra-
tive burdens of an automatic appeal could be lessened by limiting
such appeals to those aliens who historically have suffered discrimi-
natory treatment in asylum cases. Thus, an alien from Bulgaria
would have no automatic right to appeal, whereas an alien from
Guatemala would.1 8 Through such a procedure, current arbitrari-
ness in the granting of asylum could be greatly curtailed.
CONCLUSION
Implementation of the Refuge Act of 1980 has not fully resolved
the discriminatory nature of prior law. While only a small victory
for the asylum applicant, Cardoza-Fonseca does represent a step
forward by establishing that the standard for asylum is more gener-
ous than that for withholding of deportation. Fear of persecution by
its nature is a subjective emotion which knows few political bound-
aries. Thus, the determination of who is to be granted asylum
should not be based upon narrow self interest, but on the basis of
human rights violations and realistic country conditions. A more
equitable application of current law would not open the "flood-
gates" to hoards of aliens fearing persecution, but would instead
have the effect of giving relief only to those who most need it, and
yet who are unable to objectively prove that persecution would be
"more probable than not."
Until steps are taken to correct the inherent inequities in current
187. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
188. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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law, the Refugee Act and Protocol will fail in their ultimate
purpose.
Erik J. Davenport*
* This Note is dedicated to my late mother Kathryn, my beautiful wife Christine, and
my family, without whose love, support and encouragement I would not have come this far.
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